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AFTER THE DESEGREGATION ERA: THE LEGAL DILEMMA
POSED BY RACE AND EDUCATION
KEVIN BROWN*
I. INTRODUCTION
M Y remarks follow those of Judge Carter not only in presentational order
for the panel, but also in the order of educational, historical and political
realities as they present themselves in America in 1993, as opposed to 1954.
When the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Brown v. Board of Education,'
it did more than issue an opinion that specified a legal remedy for de jure
segregation. Not only did it spark a political movement in America, but it also
became a major force driving American educational theory. Public educators
accepted the twin and contradictory notions in Brown: that cultural ideology2
does not matter in designing and executing an educational program; but to the
extent that it does, it is the cultural ideology of African-Americans that
educators must help African-Americans to overcome. Brown v. Board of
Education can therefore be seen as the inspiration and justification for applying
assimilationist theories to the education of African-Americans.
Following Brown, educational theorists sought both to physically integrate
blacks in public schools and to culturally assimilate them. Accepting the
Supreme Court's opinion in Brown as gospel, public schools sought to work
the same assimilating magic on African-Americans 3 that they had worked on
* Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington School of Law. B.S., 1978, Indiana
University; J.D., 1982, Yale Law School. These remarks were delivered at the Law and
Education Section Workshop on "Diversity, Desegregation & Affirmative Action" held at the
American Association of Law Schools' Annual Meeting on January 9, 1993, in San Francisco,
California. They are a condensed version of an article entitled: Do African-Americans Need
Immersion Schools?: The Paradoxes Created by Legal Conceptualization of Race and Public
Education, 78 IOWA L. REv. 813 (1993).
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 1 will use the terms "cultural ideologies" and "cultural systems of meanings" interchange-
ably.
3. Throughout this article I primarily use the terms "African-American" and "black" to refer
to people of African descent who are in America. One of the major points of this article is that
part of what it means to be a black person in this society is to live a part of your life cast in the
role of our society's socially constructed meaning for a black person. Often individual blacks will
be treated by others (including other blacks) as part of our dominant society's view of black
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non-Anglo European immigrants two generations before. This assimilationist
educational philosophy was assumed to be basically sound, and remained intact
throughout much of the desegregation era without being seriously challenged.
Despite the desires, intentions and efforts of millions of Americans, the
war to integrate public schools has not accomplished this objective. Gary
Orfield reported that the amount of physical integration in public schools
reached its zenith in approximately 1972. Since that time segregation has
remained relatively constant.4  Even though much progress occurred in
desegregating public schools in the South, nearly one-half of all African-
American public school students in the Northeast attend schools that are ninety
percent or more black. Nationwide, sixty-three percent of African-Americans
attend schools where a majority of the students are black and thirty-two
percent attend schools that are at least ninety percent or more black.5
Not only has America failed to desegregate its public schools, but the
Supreme Court in its last two significant school desegregation decisions, Board
of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell6 and Freeman v. Pitts,7 has also set
the judicial stage for the termination of school desegregation decrees. There
are currently over 500 school districts under some form of court supervision.'
Termination of these decrees will return faculty and student school assignment
decisions back to the control of local and state education officials. Education
officials will be able to adopt, or readopt, race neutral student placement
methods, such as neighborhood school assignments,9 and possibly freedom of
persons. To me, therefore, any person of African descent in America will have his or her
personal identity in many social situations constructed consistent with the dominant social
construction of the concept of a black person in this country. My use of the term African-
American is to make the dual connection between people of African descent and American
society.
4. GARY ORFIELD & FRANKLIN MONFORT, STATUS OF SCHOOL DESEGRATION: THE NExT
GENERATION 1 (Council of Urban Boards of Education 1992).
5. See Gary Orfield, Desegregation in the Public Schools, 1968-1980, Focus, Oct. 1982,
at 4, 5 (a publication of the Joint Center of Political Studies). Orfield produced a study of
segregation in the 1980s in public schools where he has argued that there was an increase in
segregation during the 1980s. Recent studies measuring changes in segregation between 1967 and
1986 in large urban districts show that for African-Americans, desegregation appears to be related
to the existence of court-ordered desegregation plans. The studies also noted that only 3.3% of
white students now attend schools in central city school districts. GARY ORFIELD & F. MONFORT,
RACIAL CHANGE AND DESEGREGATION IN LARGE SCHOOL DISTRICTS 3 (1988); Gary Orfield,
School Desegregation in the 1980s, EQurrY CHOICE, Feb. 1988, at 25.
6. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
7. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
8. James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: All-Out School Desegregation Explained, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 1463, 1465-66 (1990).
9. The Supreme Court in Dowell held that school districts that have eliminated the vestiges
of their prior discriminatory conduct no longer require court authorization for the promulgation
of school policies, including those related to school assignments. The constitutionality of such
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choice plans. Because student assignments will no longer be motivated by an
attempt to maintain a desegregated student body, the result of the termination
of a large number of existing desegregation decrees during the 1990s will be
an increase in the amount of racial separation in public schools.' ° With this
in mind, it is probably safe to conclude that public schools have already
achieved the maximum amount of desegregation that will be achieved in the
near future.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Brown nearly forty years ago, the
federal judiciary has been the primary force behind attempts to desegregate the
public schools. The realization that racial separation in public schools will not
soon disappear, and more importantly that there are no longer any significant
institutional forces driving desegregation is, like the Court's opinion in Brown,
likely to have a significant influence on educational theory, particularly as it
applies to African-Americans. Development of educational theory based upon
a notion of standardized programs across racial and ethnic groups will become
pass6.
In fact, on the heels of the Supreme Court's school desegregation
termination opinions are new efforts that, if allowed to proceed, could
fundamentally redesign public education for many African-Americans. Public
school systems in Detroit, Milwaukee and New York City have established,
and are currently operating, what could be called "African-American
immersion schools." These schools are developed to take into account the
social environment and culture of African-Americans. As a result, they
employ alternative teaching techniques and strategies and use alternative
teaching materials to accomplish their educational mission. Among the
educational techniques they employ is the use of Afrocentric curricular
materials. Afrocentric curriculum is an emerging educational concept, and
therefore remains somewhat vague. Generally speaking, an Afrocentric
curriculum teaches basic courses from a perspective that uses Africa, and the
socio-historical experience of Africans and African-Americans, as its reference
point. As a result, an Afrocentric curriculum provides black students with an
opportunity to study concepts, history and the world from a perspective that
places them, and their ancestors, at the center.
The social and political implications of public school systems establishing
and operating schools specifically designed for blacks is obvious. We can,
therefore, expect a constitutional challenge to the decision of educators to
policies is to be determined with reference to the traditional mandate of the Equal Protection
Clause. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 245.
10. Residential segregation of African-Americans in the United States has changed only
slightly since 1960. In studies done in the 29 metropolitan areas which have populations of
blacks in excess of 150,000 (just over half of the total U.S. black population), residential
segregation improved only slightly between 1960 and 1980. See CoMMrITTE ON THE STATUS OF
BLACK AMERICANS, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SocIErY 78-79 (1989).
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establish such schools. How should the legal system respond to such a
constitutional challenge?
The Supreme Court's most recent opinions addressing issues related to
public education have repeatedly articulated that the primary objective of
public education is the inculcation of fundamental values necessary for the
maintenance of our democratic system." Because education is primarily an
acculturating process, it is only natural that educators would be concerned
about the influence of culture on the social environment of African-Americans
as they approach educational reforms for blacks. The underlying assumption
supporting immersion schools is that the educational needs of African-
Americans should not be divorced from the influence that significant cultural
systems will exert on the attitudes, opinions and beliefs they hold, as well as
the social experiences they will encounter when they interact with the
dominant culture.
In this essay, I will conduct a cultural analysis of the decision to establish
immersion schools. I will attempt to show that this analysis actually embodies
three different cultural ideologies. From the perspective of two of these
ideologies, the need for separate education for African-Americans will appear
obvious. However, because neither of these analyses provides legitimate legal
justifications for race-based decision making within the legal system's cultural
ideology, they will not function as justifications for immersion schools. The
result is that proponents of immersion schools will be forced to characterize
the schools as something which they are not in order to survive constitutional
analysis.
II. CULTURAL ANALYSIS
The essential issue raised by immersion schools is whether African-
Americans need some form of alternative education that takes into account the
social environment created by their African-American culture and the dominant
American culture of their racial social category. Blacks find themselves
socially embedded in two different cultures in the central component of race.
The ideas about race and blacks present in these cultures conflict and pull in
opposite directions. 2  Immersion schools provide educators with the
opportunity to develop educational programs for African-American students
that are responsive to the contradictory influences of African-American and
dominant American cultures.
11. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675 (1986); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68 (1979).
12. The point was first made by W. E. B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLKs 88-92
(Krans-Thompson Org. Ltd. 1973) (1903).
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A. Social Construction of African-Americans in Dominant American Culture
In our dominant culture, African-Americans are involuntary inhabitants of
a racial-social category constructed with particularly negative connotations.
Race is not merely an immutable characteristic, it is also present when the
person is present. As a consequence, our society's negative construction of
African-Americans threatens to assert itself in many social situations
encountered by blacks.
1. Enculturation of Individuals in Our Society
What passes as our individual consciousness is not developed in a vacuum.
We are not free agents bound only by our own independent choices,
perceptions and understandings of the world. Rather, our consciousness is
influenced and conditioned within the context of various cultural systems of
meanings. 13 As a result, becoming an individual in American society, or any
other society, is accomplished under the guidance of historically developed
cultural systems of meanings. Cultural ideology is the patterned system of
knowledge and conceptions which a given group has evolved from its
collective past and progressively modifies and augments to give meaning to,
and cope with, the problems of its existence.14 These systems of meanings
provide the general design for living and the patterns which various groups use
to interpret reality. They allow individuals in a given community to form,
order, point and direct their lives. In short, cultural systems of meanings are
the invisible mediums through which human understanding occurs.
In America, as in any given society, there is a dominant cultural system
of meanings. The ideas, attitudes and beliefs that are dominant in this society,
like ideas in any society, are constantly changing and metamorphosing. Some
ideas, however, come to us as the result of a very long socio-historical process
and run deep in the pantheon of the dominant American belief system.
Democracy, pursuit of wealth by the individual, meritocracy and freedom for
individuals are cultural ideas that have a long social history and are deeply
ingrained in our dominant belief system.
Among the knowledge contained in our dominant cultural system of
meanings will be knowledge related to the general competence, in routine
matters, of individuals falling into various social categories. Significant social
classifications in our society include an individual's occupation, academic
13. See, e.g., PETER L. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY:
A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 5 (1966); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL
KNOWLEDGE 73-93 (1983).
14. BRIAN M. BULLIVANT, THE PLURALIST DILEMMA IN EDUCATION 3 (1981); see also
WADE W. NOBLES, The Infusion of African and African-American Content: A Question of
Content and Intent, in INFUSION OF AFRICAN AND AFRICAN AMERICAN CONTENT IN THE SCHOOL
CURRICULUM 5-7 (A. G. Hilliard Il, et al. eds., 1990).
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credentials, race, gender, sexual orientation, socio-economic status and religion.
Each of the subcategories under these classifications carries with it certain
common knowledge about the personality traits and characteristics of people
in those categories. For example, this knowledge tells us that people with law
degrees, when compared to most people in our society, tend to be highly
motivated individuals. It also tells us that people who dropped out of high
school are more likely to engage in violent criminal behavior than college
graduates, and that nurses tend to be compassionate and caring individuals.
We rely upon this knowledge to interpret our interactions with others, often
without being aware of it. Our minds think with the aid of this knowledge.
Nevertheless, the attitudes, opinions and beliefs which are the products of
cultural systems of meanings are generally experienced by the individuals
enculturated with such meanings as a reflection of their rational deductions
from their own objective observations. As a result, we will often ascribe
personality traits and other characteristics to individuals that are consistent with
those generally believed to be possessed by people who inhabit the particular
social categories the individuals we interact with inhabit. In this way, the
identities that others ascribe to us-as well as the identities we ascribe to
others-are in part defined by the construction of the social categories that
we-or they-inhabit in a given cultural system of meanings.
Socially constructed categories in the dominant culture are an important
part of an individual's identity.' This does not mean that individuals are
automatically determined by the dominant norms and expectations that flow
from the various social categories they inhabit. In fact, individual actors may
understand themselves and others within an ideological framework that rejects
the notions contained within our dominant culture. Nevertheless, in many
15. Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 147-54 (1982). In his book,
Michael Sandel articulates three conceptions of community. One is what he calls an "instrumental
conception" based upon the conventional individualist assumptions which take for granted the
self-interested motivations of agents. This account conceives of community wholly in
instrumental terms and evokes images of a private society where individuals regard social
arrangements as a necessary burden. The second conception is one where the participants have
certain shared final ends and regard the scheme of cooperation as a good in itself. Their interests
are not uniformly antagonistic but in some cases complementary and overlapping. This
"sentimental conception" of community is also individualistic since it assumes the antecedent
individuation of subjects of cooperation whose actual motivations may include benevolent aims
as well as selfish ones. And finally, Sandel notes a third conception of community which he calls
"constitutive conception." This occurs when members of a society conceive that their identity
is defined to some extent by the community of which they are a part. For them, "community
describes not just what they have as fellow citizens, but also what they are, not a relationship
they chose (as in a voluntary association) but an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute
but a constituent of their identity." Id. at 150. It is the notion of a constitutive conception of
community that I refer to when I talk about African-Americans being members of a socially
constructed category within dominant American culture. That construction in some real way
defines a part of who they are.
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social situations people will interpret others statements, appearances, and
actions within our dominant cultural understanding. 16  As a result, the
dominant social norms and expectations will often form the most important
invisible background for interpreting the actions of individuals. Thus,
dominant cultural constructions of social categories exert a tremendous
influence on consciousness and experiences that individuals in our society have
with others.' 7
2. The Connotations Attached to African-Americans
We can both influence whether we inhabit most social categories in our
dominant culture and let others know that we inhabit those categories. For
example, it can be said that we have some control over our occupation,
religion (arguably), educational credentials or marital status. In addition,
others generally do not know these attributes or other attributes, such as our
criminal history, employment record or sexual orientation, unless we choose
to inform them. As a result, we have a considerable amount of control over
whether the judgments attached to most social categories that we inhabit will
be introduced into any given social situation.
Race, and gender, however, are unlike almost any other social categories.
We do not choose these categories and because these are generally visible
characteristics, they will be present when we are present. Our dominant
culture's socially constructed meanings for these categories are therefore
constantly threatening to assert themselves in many social situations we
encounter. This is something that is simply beyond the control of the
individual.
Our dominant racial attitudes and beliefs are the products of American
society's particular socio-historical experience and heritage. Racial attitudes
have played a central role in the American socio-historical experience,
predating the establishment of the political union itself.' While the dominant
social meanings of black people have changed over time, what it means to be
black in the dominant American culture has always been defined in derogatory
terms.
While everyone has a race, what sets African-Americans apart is the
particularly negative connotation attached to their racial social category.
African-Americans are still described, as they have traditionally been, as poor,
lazy, lustful, ignorant and prone to criminal behavior. No matter how much
16. See Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common
Law Tort, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 957, 972-74 (1989).
17. Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy": Value
Training in Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 17 (1987).
18. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (noting that the beliefs of the
founders were based upon the notion that people of African descent were considered so far
inferior that they had no rights which a white man need respect).
19931
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an individual black resists, these notions will exert a tremendous influence on
his or her life. As a result, African-Americans inhabit a racial social category
where they will be interpreted in such a way as to place them at a consistent
disadvantage. These background conditions are not transitory, but will form
the unseen backdrop of many of their social interactions throughout their entire
lives.
The measure of the benefit of any education is in how well it prepares the
student to deal with the situations that they will encounter throughout their
lives. One of the primary objectives of immersion schools is to teach African-
Americans strategies and techniques to employ in order to overcome the
obstacles placed in their path by being involuntary members of a racial social
category with such a negative connotation.
B. Existence of Cultural Conflict in Public Education
Traditionally, public education in American society, even when formally
referred to as multicultural, has employed an assimilation model. 9 Even
though most Americans would view this model as culturally neutral or
reflecting the appropriate culture, it nevertheless embodies the Anglo-American
cultural bias of the dominant American culture. Despite this bias, this model
has generally been successful when applied to voluntary immigrants from non-
Anglo Europe, Central America and Asia. That success, however, has not
been replicated by other racial and ethnic groups whose ancestors were not
voluntary immigrants to the United States. Recent comparative work by
educational anthropologists such as John U. Ogbu and Margaret A. Gibson, has
begun to document how involuntary minorities throughout the world respond
to their educational experience differently from voluntary immigrants.20 The
poor academic performance in public schools by African-Americans is
replicated by other involuntary minorities throughout the world and in the
United States-the Koreans and Burakumin in Japan, the Maoris in New
Zealand, the Aborigines in Australia, and the American Indians and certain
Latino groups in the United States.2'
The success or failure of the traditional assimilation model of public
education may, therefore, have much to do with the respective cultures of
various ethnic groups. As ethnic groups approach public education, these
groups tend to have their own cultural system of meanings that provides them
with an alternative understanding from that of the dominant culture of how
their host society works and their place in that order. Their understanding of
public education is a part of this overall understanding. The group's cultural
19. JAMES A. BANKS, MULTIETHNIC EDUCATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 12 (2d ed. 1988).
20. MINORITY STATUS AND SCHOOLING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF IMMIGRANT AND
INVOLUNTARY MINORITIES (John U. Ogbu & Margaret A. Gibson eds. 1991) [hereinafter
MINORITY STATUS AND SCHOOLING].
21. Id.
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interpretation will influence the success or failure of members of that
community in public schools. The following is a brief summary of John
Ogbu's distinction between how the cultures of voluntary immigrants and
involuntary minorities, such as African-Americans in the United States,
interpret their group's experience in their host country.2
Voluntarily immigrating to a country in search of a better life provides the
culture of immigrants with a very different reference point for understanding
their economic, social, political and educational experience in their host
country. Ethnic groups coming to America, for example, generally immigrate
because they believe that it will result in greater economic or social opportuni-
ties or more political freedom than that which existed at home. The culture
of voluntary immigrants tends to compare their economic, social, political and
educational situation to what they left behind. This comparison generally
allows them to develop a positive comparative framework for interpreting their
conditions in their new country. If voluntary immigrants did not generally
believe they were better off in their host country, many of them could, and
some of them do, exercise the option of returning to their native land.
Voluntary immigrants also come with their native culture intact. Their
native culture was, therefore, not structured around the discrimination that they
experienced in their host country. Voluntary immigrants also see the cultural
differences between themselves and dominant group members as something
that they must overcome in order to achieve their goals for a better life. This,
after all, is what brought them to their host country originally. As a result,
cultural and language differences enshrined in public schools are not generally
perceived as oppositional nor as threats to the identity that they wish to
maintain.
Voluntary immigrants can, and often do, face prejudice and discrimination
in American society and public education. When confronted with this
discrimination, the cultures of voluntary immigrants tend to interpret the
economic, political and social barriers against them as temporary problems
which can be overcome with the passage of time, hard work and more
education. Their positive comparative framework provides them with a good
deal of evidence to prove that despite the discrimination they face, they are
still better off in their host country. By viewing the obstacles they face as
flowing from their lack of knowledge about their host country, education
becomes an important element in their strategy of getting ahead. Even though
voluntary immigrants know their children may suffer from prejudice and
discrimination and their culture is often disrespected by public schools,
voluntary immigrants tend to view this as the price for the benefit derived from
being in the new country. Their positive comparative framework is also aided
by the fact that their view of public education is shaped by the condition of
22. John U. Ogbu, Immigrant and Involuntary Minorities in Comparative Perspective, in
MINORITY STATUS AND SCHOOLING, supra note 20, at 3-33.
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education in their homeland. Because opportunities for education in the United
States generally far exceed opportunities provided for most immigrants in their
native land, it is even easier to maintain a favorable view of education despite
the prejudice and discrimination they may encounter.
While voluntary immigrants come to their host country to improve their
condition, involuntary minorities were brought into their present society
through slavery, conquest or colonization. Their cultural experience of
incorporation into their host society does not include the voluntary aspect of
attempting to improve their lives that exists for voluntary immigrants. As a
result, involuntary minorities differ from immigrants in their perceptions,
interpretations and responses to their social, political, economic and education-
al situation. Involuntary minorities do not have a homeland in the same sense
that voluntary immigrants do in which to make a comparative assessment of
their condition. Their comparative reference tends to be the dominant group.
Because the dominant group is generally better off, their comparative
framework leads to a negative interpretation of their condition. Their cultural
interpretation tends to lead toward resentment, and toward perceiving
themselves as victimized by institutionalized discrimination perpetuated against
them by dominant group members and the institutions, such as public schools,
that dominant group members control. As a result, involuntary minorities tend
to distrust members of the dominant group and the societal institutions,
including public schools, which they control.
The response of involuntary minorities to prejudice and discrimination is
also very different. Unlike voluntary immigrants, they cannot point to the fact
that they are foreigners as a means in which to explain the prejudice or
discrimination they encounter. They tend to understand the prejudice or
discrimination that they experience in society and school as related to the fact
that they are members of a victimized group. Unlike foreigners who view
their condition in this society as temporary, involuntary minorities tend to view
their subordinate condition as more or less permanent.
As an involuntary minority group, the culture of African-Americans stands
in a very different relational position to that of dominant American culture
from that of the cultures of voluntary immigrants. As with other involuntary
minorities, the cultural interaction between African-Americans and the
dominant group arose after the former became an involuntary minority. In
order to live with subordination, the culture of African-Americans developed
coping responses. These responses are often perceived by African-Americans
as oppositional to that of the dominant group. African-American culture is
therefore more at odds with that of the dominant American culture enshrined
in the assimilationist model of public schools than the native culture brought
to this country by voluntary immigrants.
These cultural differences also function as boundary-maintaining
mechanisms that differentiate involuntary minorities from their oppressors,
dominant group members. They give involuntary minorities a sense of a social
[Vol. 37:897
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identity and self-worth. As a result, unlike voluntary immigrants, involuntary
minorities interpret cultural differences as differences of identity to be
maintained, not overcome. Accepting certain ideas and beliefs and learning
certain aspects of the dominant group's culture is perceived as detrimental to
their social identity.
When public schools ignore or undervalue the culture of involuntary
minorities, such as African-Americans, it is likely to have consequences far
more negative for their education than it did or will have for voluntary
immigrant groups.23 Immersion schools provide educators with the opportun-
ity to reduce the cultural conflicts that exist between the Anglo-American
culture embodied in the traditional educational program and that of their black
students, thereby eliminating a primary cause of the poor performance of
African-Americans in public schools.
III. LEGAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF IMMERSION SCHOOLS
The United States Constitution is the supreme law in America and, as a
result, it is the primary document that American society uses to justify its most
important normative choices. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is the provision of the Constitution applicable to matters of racial
discrimination. Both the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and the
arguments related thereto, which are considered acceptable as adequate legal
justifications, are structured around a certain conception of social reality. It
is this legal conception of social reality-i.e. the legal cultural system of
meaning-which is at the crux of the dispute regarding the constitutionality of
immersion schools.
A. The Role of Government in the Vision of Society Implicit in the Equal
Protection Clause
The vision of society implicit in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause generally conceives society as a collection of knowing
individuals.24 These "knowing individuals" are viewed as autonomous, self-
directed, self-determining, free-willed and rational individuals. 25  Because
these knowing individuals are self-determining and free-willed, their attitudes,
opinions and beliefs are not seen as products of various cultural systems of
meanings, but rather as individually arrived at. The effect of the social action
23. See, e.g., Signithia Fordham, Racelessness as a Factor in Black Students' School
Success: Pragmatic Strategy or Pyrrhic Victory?, 58 HARV. EDUC. REV. 54 (1988) (discussing
impact of race on high achieving black students).
24. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); FCC v. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S.
547, 609 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
25. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 181
(1990); Seyla Benhabib, Critical Theory and Postmodernism: On the Interplay of Ethics,
Aesthetics, and Utopia in Critical Theory, 11 CARDOzO L. REv. 1435 (1990).
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of these knowing individuals is presumed to be controlled by their intent.
These knowing individuals are in this way seen as the authors of their own
thoughts and the captains of their respective ships.
The Equal Protection Clause's conceptual structure of society as a
collection of knowing individuals contains its own cultural system of meanings
for interpreting social events and, particularly for purposes of this essay, the
role of government. The role of government within this conception of society
is to mediate the conduct of these knowing individuals so as to allow them to
pursue their own desires and to prevent them from unjustly interfering with the
rights of their fellow persons. Government must therefore strive to achieve a
sort of neutrality, respecting equally every knowing individual's pursuit of their
various objectives. In order for government to maintain that balance it can
neither seek to advance the parochial interest of a particular group, nor fail to
treat people as self-directing and self-determining individuals.
The legal system does recognize that some characteristics of individuals
such as race, gender and ethnicity are not the result of choice. Unlike
educators who propose immersion schools, the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause generally considers that the proper resolution
of problems related to these characteristics is for government to transcend
those characteristics in favor of treating everyone the same. For government
to treat knowing individuals the same requires that government treat them as
if they are devoid of unchosen characteristics. Government decisions to treat
people as members of a racial group are initially considered wrong and will
require compelling justifications.26
B. The Model of Education Implicit in the Equal Protection Clause
The Model of knowing individuals requires special tailoring for those
individuals who are children. Children are not born with developed cognitive
faculties. They lack the experience, maturity, and judgment of adults, and,
therefore, cannot critically evaluate what is presented to them.27 Since
26. Government is not prohibited from classifying people based on race or gender. When
racial classifications are used, courts will apply what is called strict scrutiny. In order to survive
the test, government must supply a compelling state interest and adopt a scheme that is narrowly
tailored to meet that interest. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 469. The test has been called "strict in
appearance but fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
27. See, e.g., John H. Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 321, 323
(1979) (noting that we think of children as inferior due to their physical, mental, and emotional
immaturity); Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy," 1987 U.
ILL. L. REv. 15, 18 (stating that society perceives children as "lacking the experience, perspective,
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them"); Richard L. Roe,
Valuing Student Speech: The Work of Schools as Conceptual Development, 79 CAL. L. REV.
1271, 1277 (1991) ("Furthermore, the immaturity of children is thought to make them more
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children do not enter situations as knowing individuals, their goals, prefer-
ences, and interests do not receive the same weight as those of adults.
Though children do not fit the ontological premise of knowing individuals,
the Equal Protection Clause's conception of society as a collection of knowing
individuals, does suggest an implicit model of public education that finds
support in many of the Court's more recent opinions addressing constitutional
issues in public education.s Since the requirement of governmental
neutrality is implicit in this concept of the social world, governmental
neutrality will form the basis of the implicit model of education. This implicit
model functions as the unstated norm for the role of public education from
which deviations must be justified.
The implicit model views the function of public education as converting
learners into knowing individuals. Public education, like other governmental
functions, must maintain the neutrality that flows from the conception of
society as a collection of knowing individuals. The governmental process of
converting learners into knowing individuals performs two conflicting
functions.29 Education performs a uniquely individualistic function geared
towards promoting the capacity of individuals to decide for themselves. This
academic function is viewed as value neutral, because it is intended to increase
the capacity of individuals to choose, not toward limiting their choices.30
Education also performs a limiting function for society. This limiting
function inculcates values that restrict the desirability of certain choices
individuals might make. The societal function is also value neutral, but in a
different way. This function predicates value, neutrality on instilling
fundamental values into children that make it possible for their fellow knowing
individuals to pursue their desires without undue influence. These fundamental
vulnerable to perceived negative influences that the state as well as parents may want to control
through the curricular authority vested in the state as educator.").
28. In his concurring opinion in Board of Educ. v. Pico, Justice Blackmun noted that "[t]he
Constitution presupposes the existence of an informed citizenry prepared to participate in
governmental affairs, and these democratic principles obviously are constitutionally incorporated
in the structure of our government." Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 876 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
29. Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and
Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1649 (1986).
30. Courts, legal commentators, and educators agree that one of the functions of schools is
to impart to students school-determined and school-endorsed knowledge, skills, and values. See
also Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (acknowledging that schools are vehicles for instilling fundamental
social values); Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) (describing the
schools' role as a mechanism for introducing children to cultural values). See generally JOHN G.
SAYLOR & WILLIAM M. ALEXANDER, CURRICULUM PLANNING FOR MODERN SCHOOLS (1966);
MARK YUDOF ET AL., KRP & YUDOF'S EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 145 (2d ed. 1984);
Stephen R. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine
What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1343 (1976).
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values are implicit in our democratic form of government and flow from a
conception of our society as a collection of knowing individuals.
1. The Academic Function of Public Schools
Schools disseminate useful information and teach basic academic skills,
such as reading, writing, and math. They also assist in the cognitive
development of children. Schools seek to broaden the sensibilities of children,
kindle their imagination, and foster a spirit of free inquiry.31 Schools also
foster cognitive development by providing children the opportunity to equip
themselves with the vocational skills necessary for them to become self-
sufficient and self-reliant adults.
Decisions regarding teaching techniques and curriculum fall within the
academic function of public schools. Moreover, a school's educational
officials must make choices among subjects to offer because of finite resources
and limited instructional hours. Judicial review often fails to reexamine
reasonable academic decisions because they necessarily involve the academic
expertise of educators.32
Educators also perform the academic function when they tailor education
to the abilities, needs, and interests of individual students. Public schools
regularly separate students for academic reasons.3 Generally, schools
separate fifth graders from fourth graders in order to match each child's
instruction with the individual's presumed level of maturity, experience, and
intelligence. Grade levels do not provide the only line for separating students,
many schools separate students in the same grade in core courses of english
and mathematics. In addition to separating students for instructional purposes
within a given school, many school systems have also set up alternative
schools for students with educational or social problems.
Schools also afford opportunities for students to pursue individual interests.
In junior high and high school, students routinely choose elective courses,
studying subject areas of particular interest to them. Many school systems also
operate schools of choice, "magnet schools," with a special emphasis on a
number of academic or technical areas. Specialty areas include science,
mathematics, foreign languages, and vocational programs. Parents (in
consultation with their children) choose to send children to magnet programs
31. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
32. Mark Yudof, A Battle for Students' Hearts and Minds, 126 NEw JERSEY L.J., Nov. 22,
1990, at 21 (index page 1388).
33. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc) (discussing the theoretical
underpinnings of tracking); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), cert. dismissed,
393 U.S. 801 (1968); JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK: How SCHOOLS STRUCTURE INEQUALITY
184 (1985); see also Berkelman v. San Francisco United Sch. Dist., 501 F.2d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir.
1974) (upholding assignment to college preparatory high school based on previous academic
achievement).
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due to their interest in the particular concentration offered. Providing students
and their parents with choices about educational programs illustrates the
individualistic orientation of the academic function.
2. The Socializing Function of Public Schools
Society presumes that schools engaged in the academic function are
imparting the neutral commodity of knowledge and assisting individual
students in developing reasoning and other cognitive abilities. This presump-
tion contrasts with the reality that education involves the inculcation of values.
Children attend public schools during the most impressionable intellectual
period of their lives. 4 By awakening the child to dominant American
cultural values, schools perform an important socializing function.
Through the prescription of curriculum, selection of textbooks and reading
material, employment of various teaching techniques and strategies, and
enforcement of administrative rules and regulations governing student and
teacher conduct, school officials bias the educational environment. Value
choices also determine how information will be presented-i.e. teaching
techniques. Nevertheless, in order to maintain the presumed neutrality of the
implicit model of public education, the overwhelming majority of decisions by
educators must be presumed to be value neutral.35The choice of which values shall be transmitted in public schools normally
lies with the political majority or interest group in charge of the local school
system.36 However, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area indicates
that it will override those choices when they violate what the Court has called
"fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
34. Compulsory school attendance laws in most states require children to attend some school
from approximately ages 6 to 16. WILLIAM D. VALENTE, 2 EDUCATION LAW: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE 466 (1985) (presenting appendix table showing the age range of each state during which
children must attend school). In addition, over 90% of the students who attend schools in this
country, attend public schools.
35. Even though government-sponsored education may purport to be value neutral, no such
education will exist. John Stuart Mill noted the problem with respect to government-sponsored
education:
[State sponsored education] is a mere contrivance for molding people to be exactly like
one another; and as the mold in which it casts them is that which please the predominant
power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the
majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it
establishes a despotism over the mind.
JOHN S. MILL, ON LmERTY 190-91 (1859).
36. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 168,
176-77 (1979). See also Stephen Aroms & Charles Lawrence I, The Manipulation of
Consciousness: A First Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309, 316
(1980).
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system. 37 The Court evaluates the socializing aspect of public education by
examining the values instilled by the public schools and deemphasizing the
pedagogical ramifications. Regardless of any pedagogical benefits, no
justification exists for academic decisions made by educators that violate
fundamental values. The public school's effectiveness in teaching children
"proper" fundamental values, therefore, is the primary concern of the Supreme
Court. Among the values the Court considers fundamental are tolerance for
political and religious diversity,3s patriotism, 39 belief in self-sufficiency,'
belief in racial equality,4 and a commitment to faithfully discharge the duties
imposed by citizenship. The inculcation of these values relate to a conception
of society as a collection of knowing individuals in one of two ways. These
values either promote the ability of children to develop their own capacity to
choose or it instills in them the values necessary to promote the rights of
others to choose for themselves in our society. It follows that the conception
of society as a collection of knowing individuals is at the heart of the
fundamental values articulated by the Supreme Court.
One must interpret the actions of governmental officials to determine the
values a particular action inculcates. As with any other social phenomena,
there will be multiple plausible interpretations for any given educational act.
Courts must select the most appropriate interpretation for the meaning of a
governmental act. Once the Court interprets a governmental act, it can identify
the value socialized by that act.
37. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982);
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (quoting Abington Sch. Dist, v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979).
38. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (1986) (stating that public schools must inculcate habits and
manners of civility which are fundamental values necessary for the maintenance of a democratic
political system). The court noted that "[these] values of 'habits and manners of civility' essential
to a democratic society must ... include tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even
when the view expressed may be unpopular." Id.
The liberal construction of the phrase "tolerance for political diversity" conflicts with
inculcation of certain political values, such as patriotism, respect for formal authority, and the
values enshrined in democracy. However, the term has a more narrow meaning. The narrow
construction allows schools to satisfy the goal of inculcating tolerance for political diversity by
preventing schools from engaging in "narrow political or partisan indoctrination." Board of Educ.
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879 (1982).
39. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940); West Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
40. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 241 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring). See also Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
41. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
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C. Legal Conceptualizations of Challenges to Immersion Schools
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,42 a majority of the Supreme
Court held that strict scrutiny applies to governmental classifications based on
race, regardless of the presumed beneficiaries.43 But the analysis of the
constitutionality of immersion schools is not as simple and straightforward as
applying the strict scrutiny test to the decision to establish these schools. The
constitutional analysis of immersion schools occurs in the process of legally
conceptualizing this phenomena. The proper analysis depends, therefore, on the
conception. There are four likely conceptions of immersion schools that will
produce one of three disparate results. What complicates the equal protection
analysis is that each of these conceptions and corresponding analyses will be
present in some more or less distinct form. How courts conceptualize the
schools will determine their legality.
1. Immersion Schools as Schools of Choice
For purposes of constitutional analysis, proponents of immersion schools
will attempt to characterize them as schools African-Americans choose to
attend. This conceptualization views immersion schools primarily from the
perspective of the academic function of public schools. This conceptualization
focuses primarily on two aspects of the decision to establish and operate
immersion schools. First, despite the racial reasons supporting the decision to
establish immersion schools, academic reasons are presumed to be paramount.
Therefore, the decision to establish immersion schools is seen primarily as an
educational decision with racial implications. Second, since immersion schools
will admit students on a racially neutral basis, immersion schools do not
require the government to treat students as members of a racial or ethnic
group. Conceptualizing immersion schools in this manner makes it more
probable they will survive an equal protection challenge.
a. Establishment of Immersion Schools as an Academic Decision
There are a number of different ways to view the decision to establish
immersion schools as motivated by legitimate pedagogical concerns. For
example, proponents may argue that the decision to establish immersion
schools is analogous to the decision to set up educational tracks or schools for
students with special problems. Likewise, they could argue that immersion
42. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
43. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Kennedy,
adopted strict scrutiny as the requisite test for the Equal Protection Clause, regardless of the race
of those benefitted or burdened. Id. at 493-94. Justice Scalia, in a separate concurring opinion,
also endorsed the concept of strict scrutiny regardless of the classification of the governmental
purpose. Id. at 520.
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schools are analogous to magnet schools concentrating on African-American
studies.
Finally, proponents could argue that immersion schools are a type of
laboratory experiment for school districts. The recent attention surrounding
proposals, which supposedly improve academic achievement, makes this
argument plausible.' Immersion schools provide educators with a setting in
which they can evaluate the effectiveness of various curricula and teaching
techniques in order to determine what is appropriate to meet the needs of
students. In fact, New York, Milwaukee, and Detroit--each of which operates
immersion schools-indicate that their immersion schools are experimental,
which provides them with an opportunity to find out what works and what
does not.
b. Impact of Allowing Students to Choose Immersion Schools
Our society values giving effect to individual choice.45 With respect to
public education, choice always plays a significant role. We assign students
to school not by random lot or I.Q., but by residence." Family residence
normally lies within the choice, albeit restricted by financial ability and other
considerations, of the student's parent(s) or guardian(s). In addition to
operating standard neighborhood schools, as indicated earlier, some areas
operate magnet schools, which students can choose to attend. Some school
districts allow their students to choose to attend any school in the entire school
district; moreover, Minnesota provides that option for any public school in the
state.4" Proponents will place emphasis on the choices of parents and
students to attend these schools, rather than on the motivations of educational
officials in creating them.
The racial separation of students resulting from the establishment of
immersion schools differs from de jure segregated schools. With de jure
segregation, school officials racially classify students by using a student's race
as a criteria for determining school assignments. Immersion school attendance
is voluntary. The schools are not exclusive; in fact, all students may apply
regardless of race. From this thesis, proponents can argue that the school
district does not violate the individuality of students by classifying and treating
44. See generally EDUCATION REFORM IN THE 90's (Chester E. Finn, Jr. & Theodor Rebarber
eds., 1992)[hereinafter EDUATION REFORM IN THE 90's]; NATIONAL COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE
IN EDUCATION, A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983).
45. Paul Gerwirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal,
86 COLUM. L. REv. 728, 730 (1986).
46. JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR
FAMILY CONTROL 7 (1978).
47. EDUCATION REFORM IN THE 90's, supra note 44, at 36, 47.
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them as members of a racial group." Any de facto segregation is merely the
result of private decision making. De facto segregation resulting from people's
preferences normally survives constitutional scrutiny.49
2. Colorblindness Analysis of Immersion Schools
One may analyze the decision to establish immersion schools as a
socializing decision. The message sent or. the values inculcated by the decision
to establish and operate immersion schools provides the primary consideration
in this analytical framework. The primary aspect of this conceptualization is
to view the decision to establish such schools as a racially motivated decision
with pedagogical implications. As a result, this conception will focus
primarily on race-based decision making.
Some Justices on the Supreme Court support a colorblind interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause.50 Because of the socializing function of public
education, a colorblind approach to the Equal Protection Clause would have
special appeal for disputes involving public education. The colorblind
interpretation is the embodiment of what has been called the moral imperative
of race neutrality flowing from the Equal Protection Clause.5' As Justice
48. See generally City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (noting that
school choice is determinative of the continued existence of de jure segregation).
49. Gerwirtz, supra note 45, at 750. I am assuming that any school system establishing
immersion schools is not under an obligation to disestablish a dual school system. If a school
system is under such an obligation, then a federal court will have to assess whether the
establishment of such a school is consistent with this obligation.
50. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the only time state or
local government should use racial classification is when there is a "social emergency rising to
the level of imminent danger to life and limb ... [only this type of situation] can justify an
exception to the principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that '[olur Constitution is
colorblind..."); see also Clarence Thomas, Toward a "Plain Reading" of the Constitution-The
Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 How. L.J. 983,993 (1987)("The
'superiority' of the white race would appear to depend on its acknowledgement that it is not equal
but superior and a 'color-blind Constitution' would insure that this revolutionary principle would
always be kept in mind."). Aspirations of colorblind governmental decisionmaking have a long
history in American jurisprudence dating back to the famous Harlan dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
51. Justice O'Connor stated in Metro Broadcasting that the FCC preference "embod[ies]
stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of race, evaluating their thoughts and
efforts-4their very worth as citizens-according to a criterion barred to the government by history
and the Constitution." Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 604 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor also asserted that race-based decisionmaking would fracture the
country and lead to an "escalation of racial hostility and conflict." Id. Race-based decisions
violate the societal goal of fair, individualized decisionmaking. James F. Blumstein, Defining and
Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting
Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REv. 633, 638-39 (1983) (quoting Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair
Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 243 (1971)). See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness,
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Stewart stated, "[B]y making race a relevant criterion ... the Government
implicitly teaches the public ... that people can, and perhaps should, view
themselves and others in terms of their racial characteristics. 52
If the value of racial equality is drawn from a conception of society as a
collection of knowing individuals, it will require that the government not
engage in race-based decisionmaking. Like the other fundamental values
flowing from the individualized conception of society, this definition of the
value of racial equality embodies the universal notion of knowing individuals
who are devoid of social characteristics such as race, gender, religion, and
sexual orientation.53 Government would generally violate this interpretation
of the value of racial equality when it makes decisions that account for race.
This is the application of the colorblind notion of the Equal Protection Clause
applied not to governmental classifications, but to governmental
decisionmaking.
3. Immersion Schools Failing Strict Scrutiny
The Supreme Court has not yet formally accepted the rigidity of a
colorblind application of the Fourteenth Amendment. A focus on race-based
decisionmaking involved in establishing immersion schools would probably
lead a given court to employ a strict scrutiny analysis. When applying strict
scrutiny, the Equal Protection Clause starts from an implicit standard that race
is irrelevant for purposes of governmental decisionmaking. To attach
significance to race is, therefore, presumptively irrational. To satisfy strict
scrutiny, racially motivated governmental action must satisfy a compelling state
interest. Furthermore, the racially motivated action must be narrowly tailored
to advance a compelling state interest.'
Proponents will have to argue that a compelling state interest justifies the
establishment of immersion schools. Proponents must formulate their
arguments with care to avoid making them appear grounded in racial prejudice
and stereotyping. As a result, their attempt to meet the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test may cause them to fail to meet the second part of that test.
1990 DuKE L.J. 758, 796 (1990); see also Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Advserse
Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 PA. L. REv. 540, 550 (1977).
52. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532 (1980)(Stewart, J., dissenting).
53. KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE Civil RIGHTS SocIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
VIcTiMs 10 (1988).
54. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. The Court's most recent cases dealing with issues of
affirmative action, Croson and Metro Broadcasting, suggest race-conscious measures based on
the deference accorded Congress and federal authorities under the Fourteenth Amendment are
more acceptable than measures adopted by state and local officials. However, this distinction may
only be important to Justice White since the majority opinion in Metro Broadcasting is very
similar to the dissent in Croson. Moreover, the dissent in Metro Broadcasting is very similar to
the majority opinion in Croson.
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a. Providing a Compelling State Interest
The first part of the strict scrutiny test requires that proponents of
immersion schools provide a compelling justification for their race-based
decisionmaking. It is probable that the condition of African-Americans, both
in society at large and in educational institutions, can provide a compelling
justification for the decision to establish immersion schools.
Advocates for immersion schools often cite social statistics regarding the
conditions of African-Americans outside of educational institutions to help
justify the need for such schools. Possessing an understanding of these
statistics within a conceptual framework that emphasizes how the dominant
culture influences the social environment of blacks, however, does not provide
legitimate legal justifications for immersion schools. Such an argument will
be understood as an attempt to justify immersion schools as a response to
societal discrimination. An argument structured along these lines will be
(mis)understood through the conceptual framework of society as a collection
of knowing individuals. As a result, the argument will be misunderstood and
will sound like an attempt to justify the establishment of immersion schools
with reference to the existence of widespread irrational racial prejudice
voluntarily held by many individual white Americans.
For proponents of immersion schools, despite the likelihood of judicial
misunderstanding, societal discrimination is still an attractive argument. As a
justification, it does not require any negative assertions about African-
Americans. However, attempts to supply a compelling state interest with
reference to societal discrimination will fail. The Supreme Court has
consistently rejected societal discrimination as a compelling justification for
purposes of strict scrutiny analysis. The Court has indicated that notions of
societal racism are too amorphous to justify race-based decisionmaking. 55
Without the justification of societal discrimination, proponents of
immersion schools will be forced to articulate compelling justifications by
asserting claims of racial distinctiveness. Claims of racial distinctiveness have
always embodied a potentially explosive situation for African-Americans
because they usually further derogatory beliefs about African-Americans. 56
Such will be the case in the instance of immersion schools as well.
Providing legal evidence is a process of selecting useful information and
discrediting harmful information. In order to supply compelling justifications
55. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 497; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276-
77 (1986) (expressly rejecting societal discrimination as a compelling justification for racial
classifications made in the context of public education); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 297-98 (1978).
56. For a discussion of the dilemma created for African-Americans asserting claims of racial
distinctiveness, see Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual
and Special Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 160-64 (1985).
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for the educational significance of race, proponents will have to provide useful
evidence. They must stress the poor economic and academic condition of
African-Americans. This requirement will trap proponents of immersion
schools into a discourse that encourages them to portray African-Americans in
the worst possible light. Furthermore, they will have to ignore or discredit
positive information. In fact, the more deplorable a portrayal of African-
Americans the better the chances of demonstrating a compelling state interest.
Proponents of immersion schools reinforce the negative social construction
of African-Americans in dominant American culture by pointing to empirical
evidence of the deplorable condition of African-Americans. As a result,
despite the legal resolution, the very act of attempting to defend these schools
against a race-based conception will stigmatize all African-Americans by
suggesting that they tend to be academic and social deviants.
b. Failing the Narrowly Tailored Requirement
Proponents may establish compelling justifications for the decision to
establish immersion schools by reciting negative social statistics about the
condition of African-Americans. However, basing the decision on such
statistics runs the risk of violating the second part of the strict scrutiny test.
By citing negative social statistics, proponents seem to justify the decision to
establish such schools by resting upon negative stereotypes of African-
Americans as lazy, unintelligent, poor, and prone to violent behavior.
Justice O'Connor noted that the narrowly tailored aspect of the strict
scrutiny test prevents the use of illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotypes.57
Even though racial generalizations may have some empirical basis, they
inevitably do not apply to all African-Americans. 58 Therefore, the negative
implications of the statistics stigmatize some blacks to which they do not
apply. The attempt to supply a compelling state interest could, therefore, cause
the failure of immersion schools to pass the narrowly tailored aspect of strict
scrutiny.
As indicated earlier, one of the main justifications for immersion schools
is to take into account the cultural conflict. The legal system and many
Americans see the cultural conflict as a product of the choice made by some
African-Americans to interpret social phenomena through the veil of African-
American culture. As a result, they characterize Afrocentric educators'
arguments about an inevitable clash of two competing and conflicting cultures
as a claim of racial distinctiveness made by African-Americans who choose to
make this a problem. Americans who make this recharacterization misunder-
stand the arguments based on inevitable cultural conflict. For those who
believe that the performance of African-Americans in public schools relates to
57. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
58. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 620 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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African-American culture, the impediment to the performance of African-
Americans in public schools is African-American culture, not inevitable
cultural conflict.59 If the inevitable cultural conflict is downplayed, the
arguments of the proponents take on a different understanding within the legal
system. Then the decision to establish immersion schools also appears to be
a decision based upon negative stereotypes. Hence the possibility for the legal
system viewing the decision to establish immersion schools as resting on
illegitimate racial stereotypes exists in two different aspects.
4. Surviving Strict Scrutiny
The compelling state interest analysis articulated previously remains the
same. However, the interpretation of the narrowly tailored aspect of the strict
scrutiny test changes. Parents who choose to send their children to these
schools do so on an individualized basis. As a result, proponents may argue
that individuals choose to attend these schools. To the extent anyone is
stigmatized, the only one stigmatized are those who choose to be stigmatized
when they decide to attend these schools. Therefore, overgeneralizations based
on racial stereotypes do not exist in the rationale for immersion schools.
In this legal conception, immersion schools take on a remedial appearance.
They respond to specific deficiencies of their students which cannot be
adequately addressed in the traditional education programs. Educational
officials who create immersion schools do not perceive African-Americans as
deficient students. Rather, they establish these schools for deficient students
who happen to be African-Americans.
60
IV. CONCLUSION-THE PARADOXES RESULTING FROM THE LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF IMMERSION SCHOOLS
Each of the three resolutions of the legal conflict involving the establish-
ment of immersion schools will result in a paradox. First, in conceptualizing
these schools, courts can ignore the fact that immersion schools appeal to
African-Americans and view them as racially neutral, since they are open to
all. What to some (many, most) would appear to be racially motivated
decision making actually would be deemed an educational decision, which
59. During desegregation, educators did not accept or respect the culture of African-
Americans. Education did not reduce the conflict between the cultures. Subsequently, educators
viewed the choice to adopt the deficit culture as the reason for the poor educational performance
of African-American. For a truly disheartening portrait of Black students as flawed "products",
see generally JONATHAN KOZOL, DEATH AT AN EARLY AGE: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HEARTS
AND MINDS OF NEGRO CHILDREN IN THE BOSTON PUBLIC SCHoOLS (1967).
60. While this analysis may appear to be similar to that presented earlier in this piece, the
analysis here differs from previous discussion. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text
(discussing decisions to attend immersion schools as a matter of choice). This analysis differs
from earlier discussion in that it considers application of strict scrutiny.
1993]
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
happens to have racial implications. In effect, this would cause immersion
schools, designed for African-Americans, to be labelled race-neutral. In
addition, such a conceptualization of immersion schools reinforces the notion
that the impact of culture on individual African-Americans is primarily a
matter of choice because enrollment is a matter of choice. But the justifica-
tions for immersion schools flow from a belief that the impact of culture is not
a matter of choice. As a result, the primary justifications for the schools
evaporate.
Second, courts can invalidate immersion schools from the perspective that
they violate the Equal Protection Clause. In an effort to uphold the Equal
Protection Clause's requirement of equal treatment, courts would be confining
African-Americans to an educational situation that cannot take account of the
disparate social environment created for them by the conflicting influences of
African-American and dominant Anglo-American cultures. Such a result
amounts to a declaration that the public schools treat African-American
students equally even though they are receiving an inappropriate education.
By forcing African-Americans to remain in educational institutions insensitive
to their social environment and the cultural conflicts that exist for them, courts
sanction inequality for African-American students through the guise of
equality.
The third resolution is for courts to uphold the decision of educators to
establish immersion schools because it survives strict scrutiny. The Court's
upholding of immersion schools for this reason will force proponents to
provide reasons that make their race-based decisionmaking compelling. This
will require proponents to paint the most negative picture about the plight of
African-Americans. The more miserable the condition of African-Americans
is portrayed, the better the chances of establishing the compelling interest
needed to justify immersion schools. In providing objective evidence about
the negative condition of African-Americans, however, proponents rationalize
the derogatory beliefs about African-Americans. As a result, the need to
supply legal justification will force proponents of immersion schools to argue
the reasonableness of the social construction of African-Americans in our
dominant culture. Since one of the primary justifications for immersion
schools is the negative social construction of African-Americans, this solution
reinforces the problem which makes the solution necessary.
In short, there is no solution to this problem that will not lead to a
paradox. A paradox is unavoidable because public education is an
acculturating institution. Culture necessarily influences the attitudes, opinions
and experiences of individuals in public schools and we are much more
products of our culture than choosers of our culture. Law, by contrast,
attempts to make decisions by abstracting those decisions from the social
conditions that influence them. While education focuses on the impact of
culture in molding the person, law focuses on the concept of individuals who
choose what and how they want to be. For education, culture is important.
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For law, culture is not. It is the interplay of these different cognitive
frameworks that creates the contradiction in any solution to the problem of
soundly educating African-Americans.

